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Abstract 
 
This paper undertakes an institutional analysis of the recent strategies for 
corporate expansion undertaken by News Corporation and AOL-Time Warner. 
It outlines the central elements of an institutional approach to media analysis, 
noting its relationship to critical political economy. Observing that the core 
proposition of such an approach is that corporations seek control over their 
external environment, but questioning the proposition that enterprise size is 
itself a guarantee of such control, it contrasts the recent strategies of News 
Corporation and AOL-Time Warner, in relation to globalisation, cross-media 
platform development and synergistic expansion. It argues that News 
Corporation is a global media enterprise in ways that AOL-Time Warner is not, 
and that the key to this expansion has been a willingness to let go of control 
through strategic partnerships and joint ventures. By contrast, AOL-Time 
Warner’s search for synergistic expansion through merger has largely proved 
illusory, whereas a ‘network enterprise’ strategy, that eschewed expansion and 
control in favour of strategic partnership, may have proved more successful.  
Institutions and Institutionalism 
 
Institutions have been the critical organizational innovation of the last one hundred 
years. With the dismantling of traditional forms of social life that has been a 
consequence of the rise of capitalist modernity, the concentration of economic 
resources into the form of corporations, and the growth of the nation-state as the 
principal regulator of economic, social and cultural life, institutions have become the 
organizational form most able to mediate relationships that exist in forms of mutual 
interdependence: 
 
Social, political and economic institutions have become larger, considerably 
more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective 
life. Many of the major actors in modern economic and political systems are 
formal organizations, and the institutions of law and bureaucracy occupy a 
dominant role in contemporary life (March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 1-2).  
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W. Richard Scott has defined institutions in the following terms: 
 
Institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are 
transported by various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines – and they 
operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Scott, 1995, p. 33).  
 
Scott’s definition of institutions brings out three related but distinct elements. First, 
institutions characteristically have a regulative element, as they are mechanisms for 
setting rules and establishing routines. Malcolm Rutherford has defined an institution 
as ‘a regularity of behaviour or a rule that is generally accepted by members of a 
social group, that specifies behaviour in specific situations, and that is either self-
policed or policed by external authorities’  (Rutherford, 1996, p. 182). At the same 
time, individuals do not simply comply with rules on the basis of rewards or 
punishments, but because they conform to some sense of shared values. It is in this 
second sense that institutions possess a normative element that their members commit 
to, that creates the basis for their durability over time. Work on comparative public 
policy, for example, has drawn attention to the ways in which organizations acquire a 
degree of path dependency in their responses to the external environment, that are in 
turn shaped by ideas, values and commitments that have come to be shared by key 
individuals within the institution (Castles, 1988; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999). 
Finally, there is a cognitive dimension to institutions, as institutions confer identities, 
providing the conditions through which individuals construct a shared discourse, or 
ways of understanding and interpreting what they see around them. 
 
A focus upon the importance of institutions as forms that both regulate individual 
conduct and enable collective action has been characteristic of institutionalism. 
Institutionalism has a long history as a methodology in the social sciences, existing 
alongside, and often in opposition to, other dominant discourses. In the field of 
economics in opposition to methodological individualism, or the assumption that 
societal outcomes can be derived from a series of axioms about the conduct of 
rational, maximising individuals. In this framework, also known as neo-classical 
economics, firms are treated as single decision-making units operating in a market 
context, whose conduct is shaped independently by consumer preferences, and whose 
behaviour can be understood as being relatively similar regardless of the differing size 
of actual firms and their relative power in markets (Hodgson, 1988, Chs. 3-5; cf. 
Stilwell, 2002, Ch. 20). By contrast, institutionalism gives a central role to the 
interplay between technology and organizations, the exercise of power in markets, 
and transformations in institutional behaviour and social organization over historical 
time. Geoff Hodgson describes the firm as ‘an institution of power, rather than one 
that survives due to its cost-cutting efficiency’ (Hodgson, 1988, p. 214), and observes 
that it functions in part as ‘a kind of protective enclave from the potentially volatile 
and sometimes destructive, even ravaging speculation of a competitive market 
(Hodgson, 1988, p. 208). 
 
The relevance of institutional analysis to the study of global media arises from the 
centrality of the corporate form to media organization in the 20th and 21st century. 
Large-scale corporate organizations have come to dominate the media and related 
industries in the 20th century, as there has been both greater concentration of media 
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ownership, and the absorption of small-scale commercial media producers and 
distributors by larger corporate conglomerates. What is significant about media 
concentration and conglomeration is that they mark a period where the interests of 
those other than the direct producers of creative content prevail in the determination 
of organizational priorities, and where calculations based on criteria other than 
cultural value achieve primacy in decisions about what is and is not produced and 
distributed. In such corporate organizational cultures, the owners and executives of 
large corporations in the media and creative industries will seek to maximize the 
profits, revenue, market share, share price, etc. of their own particular enterprise (c.f. 
Hesmondhalgh, 2002, pp. 68-70).  1 
 
The significance of media institutions taking a corporate form can also be seen in the 
ways in which work is organized. Richard Caves has argued that institutions come to 
prevail in the media and creative industries sectors as they provide the best means by 
which endemic risk and uncertainty about creative production and the demand for its 
final products can be managed, through the ‘internalization’ of multiple contracts 
within a single institutional entity (Caves, 2000, pp. 15-17). Hodgson points out that 
the firm provides ‘an institutional framework within which, to some extent, the very 
calculus of costs is superceded’ (Hodgson, 1988, p. 207). Davis and Scase (2000) 
have drawn attention to the rise of bureaucracy in both the commercial and publicly-
supported creative industries sectors as a means of controlling and co-ordinating the 
creative process. In the bureaucratic model, the mechanisms of control and co-
ordination are explicit and hierarchical, and creative people are motivated both by 
conventional measures of income and status within the organization, and by some 
degree of ‘internalized commitment’ to the organization and its values. Within 
commercial organizations, the internalization of contracts within the corporate form 
provides, as Caves (2000, pp. 10-14) has observed, a means of having access to 
creative content in ways that can internalize the risk and uncertainty associated with 
the capacity of such content to reach audiences and realize sales in cultural markets.  
 
The corporate form of institutional organization in the media sector also has attached 
to it a series of legal and governance requirements. These include both generalized 
forms of law and regulation such as company law, workplace relations law, and 
competition policy, and specific forms of policy and modes of regulation applied 
specifically to media organizations as socially and culturally influential institutions. 
Price (1995), Streeter (1996) and Donald (1998) have observed, in relation to 
broadcast media, that both the nature of broadcasting property (the licence to 
broadcast) and broadcasting markets are artefacts of government policy, and the ways 
in which industry structure and conduct are shaped through law and regulation. 
Monroe Price prefers to refer to government structuring of broadcast television rather 
than regulation, since ‘government structuring refers to the specific efforts by 
governments to determine the ownership, management, and content of systems for the 
distribution of television signals and the associated aspects concerning the production 
of programmes’ (Price, 1995, p. 16). This structuring of the right to broadcast through 
government-sanctioned property regimes can be seen as an example of how ‘the state 
shapes an economy’s organizational structure – the different institutional 
arrangements that actors use to co-ordinate exchange and production’ (Campbell and 
Lindberg, 1990, p. 634). Broadcast media mark out a specific instance of what 
Campbell and Lindberg identify as a more generalized capacity of government 
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agencies to both define the nature of property rights and the legitimate domains 
through which they can be exercised: 
 
Property rights define the institutional basis of power relations in production, 
exchange and accumulation, rather than just the relationship of actors to 
property. The ability to manipulate property rights affords the state important 
leverage over the balance of power among actors in the economy (Campbell and 
Lindberg, 1990, p. 642).   
 
The institutionalist approach has much in common with that of critical political 
economy (Garnham, 1990; Golding and Murdock, 1991; Gandy, 1992; Mosco, 1996; 
Sussman, 1997). Both approaches have developed in media and communications 
research, and in the social sciences more generally, as alternatives to the orthodoxies 
of liberal economic and political thought, including post-WWII mass communication 
theory (c.f. Babe, 1993) Both approaches share a common critique of mainstream 
economic theory, summarised by Golding and Murdock (1991, pp. 17-22) as:  
 
1. A focus on the interplay between economic organization and social, cultural 
and political life, as opposed to a compartmentalisation of economic theory 
from other domains; 
2. A methodology which starts from an understanding between social relations 
and relations of power, rather than methodological individualism and 
consumer sovereignty; 
3. A concern with the historical processes which underpin contemporary forms 
of economic organization, rather than an a-historical, comparative statics 
approach; 
4. A concern with the relationship between corporate power and public 
intervention, seen not simply as the government regulation of commercial 
markets, but as entailing mediation of the relationship between capitalism and 
liberal democracy; 
5. A demand that explicitly stated ethical principles, such as justice, equity and 
the public good, act as framers of intellectual practice, and a rejection of the 
positivist distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values’.  
 
An institutional approach draws attention to the strategies used by corporations to 
achieve control over the external environment, arguing that the corporate form has 
been a necessary institutional development for the exercise of such power, particularly 
in light of the scale and cost of new technologies, and the risks associated with the 
application of new technologies in order to produce new products for mass markets 
(e.g. Galbraith, 1973). To this end, corporations are forced to plan, and to exercise 
control over market variables such as costs, prices, relations with suppliers, consumer 
demand, and, indeed, over the regulatory environment in which they operate. Stilwell 
(2002, pp. 230-235) has identified four levels at which corporate planning involves 
the exercise of power in order to achieve greater control over the external 
environment: 
 
1. Power within the corporation: there must be alignment between the interests 
shareholders, corporate boards, and managers within the corporation; 
2. Power between corporations: large corporations in oligopolistic markets (i.e. 
those with relatively few suppliers) will characteristically minimise the extent 
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of potentially destructive competition with one another, while at the same time 
exercising power in relations with suppliers and distributors, who are typically 
in more competitive market environments and become dependent upon the 
large corporations. For Galbraith, this has generated a dual economy, between 
those large corporations that he terms a part of the planning system, and 
smaller corporations who continue to operate in the more conventionally-
defined market system; 
3. Power over consumers: in contrast to mainstream neo-classical economics, 
where consumer preferences drive production, Galbraith argued that large 
corporations employ an increasing share of their resources to the creation of 
new consumer wants, and the management of consumer demand, through 
advertising and other sales promotion activities; 
4. Power over state agencies: large corporations invest heavily in the 
development of industry associations, and the building of lobbying networks, 
in order to ensure that state regulatory agencies come, ideally, to share their 
views on what is best for the industry. 
 
The question which needs to be asked is to what extent they succeed in achieving 
such control over their external environment. It has been argued that institutional 
analysis has often assumed too much control by institutions over their external 
environment, and given insufficient weight to the factors which constrain institutional 
conduct. According to Graham Murdock (1982) institutionalism has tended to over-
estimate the power and autonomy of large corporations, and to understate the 
continuing significance of competition as a constraining force upon corporate 
institutional power. Murdock (1982) has observed that institutional theories tend to be 
strongly influenced by ‘managerial revolution’ theories, which assume that control 
over large corporations has passed from owners to managers, who prioritise corporate 
growth and control over the external environment over profits.  
 
This focus upon external constraints also challenges the tendency of institutionalists 
to equate competitiveness with size, and to assume that large corporations face less 
competition than smaller businesses. Such an approach is consistent with recent 
empirical work on competition, which stresses that it is the scope to restrict the entry 
of new players into an industry, rather than the structure of an industry per se, or the 
size of the largest corporations in an industry, that determines the degree of 
competitiveness in a market (Collins and Murroni, 1996, pp. 59-60). Clifton (1977) 
has also argued that competition is in fact greater in advanced capitalism than in 
earlier eras, as the development of global capital markets maximises the scope for 
financial capital to move freely in search of the highest rates of return, which in turn 
acts as a powerful disciplining force upon corporate behaviour. 2 
 
An attempt to synthesise the institutionalist and Marxist perspectives in order to 
understand contemporary capitalist enterprises can be found in the theory of 
monopoly capitalism. In his influential development of this theory, Paul Sweezy 
agues that while monopolization (he concentration and centralization of capital) was 
anticipated in Marx’s own writings, its subsequent development meant that there had 
been a transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism in the 20th century 
(Sweezy, 1987). The monopoly capitalist theory holds that large corporations in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets have acquired a substantial degree of control 
over their external environment, to the extent that a permanent hierarchy of profit 
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rates can be maintained that correlates to the concentration of industries (Sweezy, 
1987, p. 302).  
 
The theory of monopoly capitalism is important in an understanding of contemporary 
global media as it informs some of the most influential work in the political economy 
of communications. Most notably, it provides the conceptual underpinning for the 
critiques of media concentration and the expansion of global media found in the work 
of Robert McChesney, Edward Herman (Herman and McChesney, 1997; McChesney, 
1999; McChesney, 2002).  In a recent appraisal of the operations of global media 
markets and the restructuring of economic ownership, McChesney observes that: 
 
The global media system is fundamentally non-competitive in any meaningful 
economic sense of the term. Many of the largest media firms have some of the 
same shareholders, own portions of one another, or have interlocking boards of 
directorates … the global media market more closely resembles a cartel than it 
odes the competitive marketplace found in economic textbooks (McChesney, 
2002, pp. 155, 156).  
 
In their well-known books, The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Global 
Capitalism, Edward Herman and Robert McChesney argue that media globalisation 
is, in effect, the relentless dynamic of giant media corporations in monopoly 
capitalism expanding their operations onto a world stage. They propose that ‘the 
global media market is dominated by ten or so vertically integrated media 
conglomerates … [which] operate in oligopolistic markets with substantial barriers to 
entry’ (Herman and McChesney, 1997, p. 104).  
 
The question of whether the global media has become concentrated to such a point 
that competition is being gradually eliminated in the media sector has recently been 
the subject of debate on the Web site openDemocracy www.opendemocracy.org. 
McChesney’s argument that ‘there are now fewer and fewer companies controlling 
more and more’ (McChesney, 2001) has been contested by Benjamin Compaine, 
author of Who Owns the Media (Compaine and Gomery, 2000). Compaine argues 
that: the share of the top 50 media companies over total U.S. media revenues in 1999 
is comparable to that of 1986; there has been significant movement within the ‘league 
table’ of major media companies; the Internet has introduced now forms of 
competition to traditional media giants; and that the competitive advantages 
associated with conglomeration and globalisation need to be weighed up against new 
forms of risk and possibilities to accrue losses that such expansionary activities can 
lead to (Compaine, 2001). While more sympathetic to the politics of McChesney than 
the position of Compaine, David Hesmondhalgh has also acknowledged that there are 
limits to assuming that ‘every takeover or merger and every announcement of a 
corporate alliance is presented as if it were evidence of terminal decline’ 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2001), and has pointed to the limits of conflating concentration of 
ownership with a lack of diversity of content, or with a loss of autonomy for creative 
personnel.  
 
Media Corporations and the External Environment: Concentration 
and Conglomeration 
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From the analysis developed so far, it can be anticipated that media corporations will 
adopt strategies of expansion as the principal means of achieving greater control over 
their external environment. Expansion in the media sector not only involves 
competitive strategies to expand market share within particular industries and 
geographical markets, but may also take five other forms: 
 
1. Horizontal expansion, through takeovers, mergers and acquisitions of 
competitors within the industry in which they are dominant, or the 
development of new products and services within that industry; 
2. Vertical expansion, or takeovers, mergers and acquisitions of related 
production and distribution interests within the industry supply chain, or the 
development of new enterprises in these related areas; 
3. Diagonal expansion, or conglomeration, which involved expansion into 
complementary activities, either through mergers and acquisitions or the 
development of new enterprises, that enable productive synergies to be 
developed; 
4. Diversification, or expansion into non-media activities (or, correspondingly, 
non-media companies expanding into media industries); 
5. Globalisation, or the expansion of production or distribution into other 
national or regional markets.  
 
The last decade has been an intense one in media-related merger and acquisition 
activity. As Table 1 shows, expansion through conglomeration or diagonal expansion 
was at least as important as direct media mergers through horizontal or vertical 
expansion.  
Table 1 
Major Media Industry Mergers and Acquisitions 1989-2000 
Year Acquiring 
firm 
Acquired firm 
(new name in 
brackets) 
Price  
$US 
billion 
Type of strategic expansion 
1989 Time Inc. Warner 
Communication 
14.1 Diagonal  (publishing with 
film/broadcasting/music) 
1994 Viacom Paramount 
Communication 
8.0 Diagonal (broadcasting/cable with 
publishing, film and theme parks) 
1994 Viacom Blockbuster 8.5 Vertical (distribution control) 
1995 Disney Capital 
Cities/ABC 
19 Vertical (linking content creation, 
packaging and distribution  in TV 
broadcasting) 
1995 Time Warner Turner 
Broadcasting 
7.4 Vertical (linking content and 
distribution across broadcast/cable 
TV) 
 
1995 Seagram MCA (Universal) 5.7 Conglomeration (spirits distiller 
moves into diversified media) 
1995 Westinghouse CBS 5.4 Conglomeration (general 
conglomerate moves into 
broadcasting) 
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1998 AT&T TCI/Liberty Media 48 Diagonal (telecoms-media 
convergence) 
1998 Seagram PolyGram 10.6 Diversification 
1999 Carlton United 8 Horizontal (merger of European 
media groups) 
1999 Viacom CBS 22 Vertical (consolidation of 
broadcast/cable media interests) 
2000 Vivendi Seagram/Universal 35 Conglomeration (diverse European 
conglomerate with media and non-
media interests buys into US-based 
media interests) 
2000 AOL Time-Warner 1283 Diagonal (merger of Internet 
service provider with media 
conglomerate) 
 
Source: Hesmondhalgh, 2002, p. 136.  
 
We can make sense of these expansionary strategies in the following manner: 
 
Figure 1 
Expansion Strategies of Media Corporations 
 
 
Source: Sanchez-Tabernero et al., 1993, p. 66.  
 
From the point of view of individual media corporations, the benefits associated with 
expansion through concentration and conglomeration are as follows: 
 
1. Increased size offers substantial opportunities to realise economies of scale. As 
the marginal costs of reproduction of media products and services are typically 
low, approaching zero in industries such as broadcasting, the capacity to 
 
Core media 
Distribution/delivery 
(downstream vertical 
expansion) 
Production/facilities 
(upstream vertical 
expansion) 
Other media 
(diagonal expansion/ 
conglomeration) 
Non-media 
(diversification) 
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increase profitability through the expansion of market share is substantial. 
Gillian Doyle has documented a strong correlation between the size of market 
share and operating profit margins in the United Kingdom’s television 
broadcasting, television production, radio broadcasting and newspaper 
industries (Doyle, 2002, pp. 46-60); 
2. The size of media institutions, and their operation across multiple media, 
enables economies of scope to be realised, as diversification of output allows 
for a greater degree of product differentiation, to meet highly diverse audience 
tastes. Caves (2000, p. 6) observes that creative outputs are both vertically 
differentiated (i.e. there are distinct and recognisable differences in format, 
genre etc. within the product range), and horizontally differentiated (i.e. there 
are differences within a format, genre etc. that are recognizable to consumers 
and inform their consumption decisions – both Vin Diesel and Steven Seagal 
may make ‘action’ films, but the differences in style for an action film 
connoisseur are considerable); 
3. The advantages of critical mass in providing leverage in deals with suppliers, 
buyers and advertisers, particularly if this is seen as having the potential to be 
linked to future expansion;  
4. There is scope for cost reduction through vertical integration in particular, as 
they offer the opportunity to reduce transaction costs through the 
‘internalization’ of information about market requirements and product 
development strategies, and reduce the time and cost associated with contract 
negotiation and content acquisition. The national networking of broadcast TV 
and radio stations can be understood as a cost reduction strategy along these 
lines; 
5. There is also scope for risk reduction, as the uncertainty of consumer demand 
for individual creative and media products – what Richard Caves terms the 
‘nobody knows’ principle (Caves, 2000, p. 3) – can be minimized through the 
devotion of greater resources to market research, and through the capacity to 
operate across multiple media, thereby ‘covering all bases’ in case of 
significant changes in consumer preferences (e.g. a switch from cinema to TV, 
as occurred in the United States in the 1950s, or a switch towards home-based 
entertainment, or accessing content through the Internet); 
6. Vertical integration provides ready access to content streams over time, by 
securing a link between the content production, content packaging and content 
distribution elements of the media supply chain; 
7. Finally, and most tantalisingly, media conglomeration has offered the 
opportunity for cross-promotion of media content and the realisation of 
economic rents across multiple media. Disney has been a master of achieving 
such product synergies across its movie production and distribution, 
publishing, merchandising and theme park divisions (Wasko, 2001), and 
attempts to realise such cross-media synergies have been many and varied 
over recent years.  
 
Notwithstanding all of these potential benefits arising from media concentration and 
conglomeration, there are a number of economists who are sceptical of the claims that 
‘bigger is better’, and that the growth of the size of media corporations necessarily 
entails the diminution of competition. Taking the latter proposition first, there is an 
argument that large diversified media conglomerates are most likely to be the new 
players in markets characterised by long-established oligopolies and significant 
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barriers to entry. The most obvious example is the development by News Corporation 
of the Fox Network as a direct competitor to the ‘Big Three’ U.S. commercial 
broadcasters in the mid-1980s. There seems to be little doubt that, with the 
development and growth of cable and satellite TV, and the emergence of new 
broadcast networks such as Fox and UPN, the three major broadcast networks in the 
United States – CBS, NBC and ABC – have faced a much more competitive 
environment in U.S. television than was the case in the 1970s.  
 
More generally, dangers exist in corporate expansion in the media industries based 
upon vertical integration and conglomeration. Compaine (2000) draws attention to the 
paradox of vertical integration, where the guarantees of ready access to content 
assured through such strategies may lead to ongoing access to the ‘wrong’ content in 
terms of market demand, while better content is developed outside of the 
organization. From the point of view of media content producers, there are dangers 
associated with being too closely linked to a single media distributor, that arise from 
both the potential to get more financially remunerative contracts from competitors, 
and the potential constraints upon creative autonomy.  
 
There is also a long history in the media industries of corporate bankruptcies resulting 
from the pursuit of spurious synergies, and exposure to new forms of risk by entry 
into industries that the parent company had little knowledge of. A far too literal belief 
in the rise of the knowledge economy, for example, led one Australian media 
entrepreneur – the now-jailed beer and boating tycoon Alan Bond – to invest in both a 
private university and a commercial TV broadcaster, on the spurious belief that the 
former may provide content to the latter! (O’Regan, 1993, p. 45). More recently, 
virtually all significant media corporations in the late 1990s made an investment in 
Internet-related stocks, or developed new online enterprises, on the back of the 
‘dot.com’ boom on the NASDAQ, only to either sell shares at a substantial loss or 
quietly absorb these loss-making ventures back into the parent company, as the early 
2000s revealed the hype surrounding Internet enterprises to be substantially 
overstated. Richard Caves is sceptical about the potential for expansion of media 
corporations and the achievement of greater control over their external environment 
through conglomeration, observing that ‘the synergies they pursue are probably 
illusory … [and] they at best offer defensive value when they unite media content 
with distribution channels’ (Caves, 2000, p. 328).  
 
A Tale of Two Synergies: News Corporation and AOL-Time Warner 
 
News Corporation and AOL-Time Warner represent two global corporate media 
giants through whom we can test some of these arguments. They are both clearly in 
the ‘top tier’ of global media corporations, with AOL-Time Warner having global 
revenues of $40.96 billion in 2002, and News Corporation having revenues of $29 
billion in 2002. They are two parts of what McChesney (1999, p. 91) terms the ‘Holy 
Trinity of the global media system’, the third being Disney Corporation. Both 
exemplify a strategy of expansion through vertical and diagonal integration, and have 
indeed been central to its most critical moments: News Corporations’s acquisition of 
2oth Century Fox and the Metromedia broadcasting stations in 1985 marked the first 
big merging of film studios with television interests, and created a competitor in U.S. 
broadcast markets for the ‘Big Three’ television networks, while the merger of Time 
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Inc. and Warner Communication in 1991 marked the first major development of the 
recent conglomeration boom. The 2001 merger of America OnLine and Time-Warner, 
as well as being the largest merger in corporate history, also involved the most 
dramatic attempt to develop productive synergies between traditional print and 
broadcast media and the dynamism of new media and the Internet to generate truly 
convergent media platforms and content.  
 
The extent to which both AOL-Time Warner and News Corporation operate across 
multiple media industries and platforms can be seen from the table below: 
 
Table 2 
Media Interests of AOL-Time Warner and News Corporation 2002 
 
 AOL-Time Warner News Corporation 
Net Revenue 
2002 ($US bn) 
$40.9bn $29bn 
Country of Origin/ 
Corporate HQ 
United States United States/Australia 
Broadcasting & Cable/ 
Satellite TV 
CNN, Turner Broadcasting, 
Cartoon Network, 
WB Television Network 
Fox Broadcasting, Sky Global, 
Fox Sports, BSkyB (UK), 
FOXTEL (Aust.), STAR TV 
(Asia), ZEE TV (India), Canal 
Fox (Latin Am.) 
Movie Production & 
Distribution     
Warner Communications, 
New Line Cinema, 
Hanna-Barbera, Castle Rock 
Twentieth Century Fox,  
Fox Filmed Entertainment 
Newspapers & 
Magazines 
Time Inc., Time-Life, DC 
Comics 
TV Guide, Weekly Standard, 
New York Post (US), The 
Times, The Sun, News of the 
World (UK), The Australian and 
various (Aust.),  
Publishing Little, Brown & Co., 
Warner Books 
Harper Collins, 
Morrow/Avon 
Recorded 
Music 
Atlantic, Elektra, 
Maverick, 
Rhino, 
Warner Music, 
WEA 
 
Multimedia America Online (AOL) incl. 
Netscape, CompuServe, ICQ 
EA.com (partial), Healtheon/ 
WebMD, TheStreet.com (with 
New York Times), Gemstar-TV 
Guide International 
Other Interests Sporting teams (eg. Atlanta 
Baseball, Hawks Basketball 
Sports teams (eg. LA Dodgers 
baseball), National Rugby 
League (Aust.-50%), Newspoll 
(Aust.- 50%) 
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Just as the case of News Corporation and AOL-Time Warner display important 
similarities as strategies for expansion through vertical integration and 
conglomeration, they also display very important differences. Three stand out: (1) 
News Corporation’s globalisation strategy and its linkages to a ‘network enterprise’ 
model; (2) the pros and cons of cross-platform synergy, particularly between film 
studios, television networks, and cable systems and channels; and (3) the spurious 
nature of synergistic expansion when it simply involves cross-subsidisation within the 
conglomerate enterprise, and the scope for organisational friction in the newly-
merged AOL-Time Warner.  
 
a) News Corporation as a Global Network Enterprise 
 
In his polemic with McChesney, Compaine argues that there is only one truly global 
media enterprise, and that is News Corporation. News Corporation generates 24.4 per 
cent of its revenues outside of the United States, as compared to 20.3 per cent for 
AOL-Time Warner. 4 More importantly, 32.2 per cent of News Corporation’s assets 
are held outside of the United States, with 11.1 per cent in the United Kingdom and 
Europe, 9.7 per cent in Australasia (Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific), and 11.4 
per cent held in Asia and Latin America. By contrast, AOL-Time Warner does not list 
its assets located outside of the United States in its Annual Report since the 
overwhelming bulk of its international revenues are derived from the sale of U.S. 
copyrighted products abroad.  
 
In terms of globalisation theory, the difference is crucial. While AOL-Time Warner is 
largely engaged in what U.S.-based media corporations have done since the 1920s – 
selling creative products to the rest of the world – News Corporation has been 
systematically engaged in the building of a geographically dispersed assets base 
through direct foreign investment, strategic partnerships, and mergers and 
acquisitions. Indeed, its entry into the United States film, broadcasting and cable 
markets in the 1980s from its home base in Australia marked it out as a media 
corporation that was developing a truly global market strategy. Dunning (2001) 
argues that it is this activity to accumulate a geographically dispersed assets base, and 
to seek competitive advantage in multiple national and regional markets through 
foreign investment, rather than simply marketing product on an international scale, 
which enables us to speak of the current era as one of an emergent global capitalism.  
 
News Corporation’s globalisation strategy has also been marked by the significant 
role played by joint ventures and strategic partnerships in its investments outside of its 
three ‘home bases’ of the United States, Australia and Britain. Outside of the area of 
newspapers and magazines – where News Corporation has no significant holdings 
outside of the US, Britain and Australasia – and outside of the activities of Fox 
Filmed Entertainment and Fox Television in the United States, joint ventures and 
strategic partnerships have indeed been the norm. In its investments in Asia and Latin 
America in particular, News Corporation has displayed the characteristics that 
Dunning (2001) identifies as increasingly characterising the foreign investment 
strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs): 
 
1. A sequential relationship between foreign portfolio investment (in the form of 
joint ventures, strategic partnerships, and mergers and acquisitions) preceding 
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foreign direct investment, as part of the network enterprise (Castells, 1996, 
2001) or alliance capitalism (Dunning, 2001) strategy, that emphasises inter-
firm networking; 
 
2. An increasing importance being attached to strategic asset seeking 
investments that better enable MNEs to internalise local advantages in terms 
of organizational learning, cultural awareness, innovation opportunities, and 
opportunities to augment knowledge assets in a variety of national and 
regional markets, as compared to cost-reducing investments aimed at lowering 
production costs in products intended for distribution in world markets; 
 
3. Foreign investments aimed at acquiring greater access to knowledge assets and 
intellectual capital rather than direct production resources (land, capital, 
labour, resources), in order that an MNE can ‘organize its activities in order to 
create future assets, rather than optimize the use of its existing assets’, and 
better engage in ‘the creation, as well as the use, of resources and capabilties’ 
(Dunning, 2001, p. 100). 5 
 
Table 3 
News Corporation’s Strategic Partnerships and Joint Ventures, 
2002 
 
 UK & 
Europe 
Asia Japan Latin 
America 
Australia 
& New 
Zealand 
Broadcasting, 
Cable/ 
Satellite TV 
BSkyB 
(36%) 
Stream 
(50%) 
Balkan News 
Corp. (75% 
STAR TV 
Channel [V] 
(87.5%) 
Phoenix 
Satellite TV 
(37.6%) 
ESPN STAR 
Sports (50%) 
Vijay TV 
(51%) 
Viva Cinema 
(50%) 
Zee Telefilms 
(3.9%) 
Space Shower 
Networks 
(10%) 
Taiwan Cable 
Systems 
(20%) 
Hathway 
Cable and 
Datacom 
(26%) 
SKY 
PerfecTV! 
8.1%) 
News 
B’casting 
Japan (80% 
JSky Sports 
(14.3%) 
Sky Movies 
(50%) 
Nihon Eiga 
Satellite 
B’casting 
(15%) 
Cine Canal 
(22.5%) 
Sky Latin 
American 
DTH 
Platforms 
* Mexico- 
Innova (30%) 
* Brazil – 
NetSat 36%) 
* Sky Multi-
County 
Partners 
(30%) 
FOXTEL 
(25%) 
Fox Sports 
Aust. (50%) 
Sky Network 
TV (30%) 
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Movie 
Production & 
Distribution     
   Fox Studios 
Baja 
Canal Fox 
Telecine 
(12.5%) 
 
 
 
Other 
Interests 
NDS (79%) 
Broadsystem 
The Wireless 
Group (19%) 
Sky Radio 
(71.5%) 
Radio 538 
(42%) 
News 
Outdoor 
Group (75%) 
Beijing PDN 
Xinren 
Information 
Technology 
(69.6%) 
21CN 
Cybernet Crop 
(41%) 
UTV Software 
Comm 
(19.9%) 
Digiwave 
Infrastructure 
(50%) 
Yesky.com 
(20%) 
  News 
Interactive 
Festival 
Records 
Newspoll 
(50%) 
 
Louw (2001) has identified News Corporation’s global business model as being that 
of the global network enterprise, where: 
 
We can find multiple (and proliferating) styles of control and decision-making 
being tolerated in different parts of the network, so long as those at the centre of 
the web can gain from allowing a particular practice and/or organisational 
arrangement to exist in a part of their networked ‘empire’ (Louw, 2001, p. 64). 
 
Louw is drawing here upon Manuel Castells’ (1996, 2001) account of the network 
enterprise as the emergent form of business organisational practice in the global 
network-based economy, as it possesses the advantages of scalability on a global scale 
(i.e. it can be expanded or contracted through entry into/withdrawal from partnerships, 
rather than direct investment in physical capital), managed flexibility, and the benefits 
of co-branding and common access to a pool of content. As will be indicated below, 
News Corporation’s networked, partnership-based form of expansion has proved to 
possess advantages that have not been found in strategies of synergistic expansion 
through mergers, as AOL-Time Warner has pursued.  
Cross-Platform Synergies 
 
Both News Corporation and AOL-Time Warner have reinvented themselves as 
corporate entities through mergers and acquisitions. Through the acquisition of Fox 
and other strategies to become a global flim and television giant, News Corporation 
went from being an enterprise whose assets were overwhelmingly in newspaper and 
magazine publishing in the 1980s to one that now has 63.7 per cent of its total 
corporate assets in the areas of film, television, and cable/satellite network 
programming. The Time-Warner merger of 1989 brought together the strength in 
publishing of Time Inc. with the longstanding presence in film, music and television 
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production of Warner Communication, and this was further expanded into the cable 
television area with the acquisition of Turner Broadcasting in 1996.  
 
The strength of cross-platform synergies is most clearly seen in the relationship 
between film studios, television networks and cable/pay television platforms. It is in 
this area that the synergistic possibilities of control across the media supply chain are 
most apparent. 
 
Figure 2 
The Media Supply Chain 
 
 
Source: Doyle, 2002, p. 18.  
 
The four major U.S. based media players – AOL-Time Warner, News Corporation, 
Disney and Viacom – have all moved aggressively in this direction, particularly in 
their US operations, principally through mergers and acquisitions: 
Table 4 
Vertical Integration of Film Studios, TV Networks and Cable 
Platforms 
 AOL-Time 
Warner 
News 
Corporation 
Disney Viacom 
Film Studio Warner Bros Fox Filmed 
Entertainment 
Disney Paramount 
(acquired 
1994) 
TV Network WB Network Fox TV ABC (acquired 
1995) 
CBS (acquired 
1999) 
UPN 
Pay TV 
platform 
Time Warner 
Cable 
DirecTV 
(acquired 2003, 
subject to FCC 
clearance) 
 Viacom Cable 
Pay networks/ 
channels 
HBO 
Cinemax 
TW Sports 
CNN 
Comedy Central 
TBS 
Fox News 
Fox Kids 
Fox Sports 
Fox Movies 
FX 
National 
Disney Channel 
ESPN 
History Channel 
E! Entertainment 
MTV 
Nickelodeon 
Nick at Nite 
CMT 
TV Land 
TNN 
CONTENT  
PRODUCTION 
 CONTENT 
‘ PACKAGING 
      FINAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
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TNT 
TCM 
Cartoon Channel 
Geographic 
(50%) 
VH1 
Showtime 
Comedy 
Channel 
 
 
The consequences of such vertical integration can be seen in recent US network 
programming strategies. McChesney (1999) observed that the big six Hollywood 
studios (Warners, Disney, Universal, Paramount, Fox and Columbia) accounted for 37 
of the 46 new prime time shows on US network TV in 1998. Moreover, the four 
studios which also own TV networks (Warners/WB, Disney/ABC, Viacom/UPN and 
News Corp/Fox) produced 29 of these 46 shows, which went almost entirely to their 
own network (McChesney, 1999, pp. 21-22). The Viacom/CBS merger, which 
occurred in 1999, strengthened this trend still further. That said, the questions still 
need to be asked: ‘Is this new?’, and ‘Does it work?’. In particular, does it work to 
articulate these strategies, developed in the context of the US mediascape, to a global 
strategy for corporate expansion? 
 
Vertical integration is not a new phenomenon in the media industries. From the 
advent of the twenties until the outset of the 1950s, the period known as the ‘golden 
age of Hollywood’, the much celebrated studio system was characterised by the in-
house nature of all facets of production, distribution and exhibition.  Hollywood was 
characterised during this period by an extremely high concentration of ownership and 
vertical integration, that included control over content creators (actors, writers etc.) as 
well as the means of production and distribution (Balio, 1990; Sklar, 1994). With 95% 
of screen time controlled by the majors, smaller independent producers and exhibitors 
were effectively shut out of the market. This in turn sparked anti-trust investigations 
by the Justice Department which resulted in the Supreme Court putting an end to 
vertical integration in 1948, divorcing exhibition from production and distribution and 
outlawing block booking practices. The end of this first great era of vertical 
integration coincided with the rise of television in America, which by 1959 reached 
90% of all homes.   
 
In contrast to the first wave of vertical integration, which focused upon control over 
creativity as well as distribution, the vertical integration practices of the last two 
decades have been primarily driven by the need to secure multiple revenue windows 
for expensively produced television programming, or what has been described above 
as economies of scope. News Corporation, through its US-based studio and network 
Fox, and its globally spread subscription television platforms (Sky Global Networks 
(SGN)), has explored the possibilities of squeezing the absolute maximum value out 
of its content.  In addition to global distribution, media conglomerates like News 
exploit their content by sharing programming across their multiple delivery platforms.  
This strategy, dubbed ‘repurposing’ or ‘multiplexing’, has seen prime-time dramas 
and sitcoms repeated on cable channels as soon as one day after their network airing: 
 
Fox has exposed viewers to its drama 24, by showing it once a week on its 
broadcast network, and twice a week on its cable channel Fx.  With 
repurposing, the networks are trying to give viewers more chances to see a 
show, therefore re-aggregating the lost audiences.  “The economics of the 
industry don’t justify the expensive programming we’re making right now, 
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unless you have additional windows to exploit it,” says Jamie Kellner, 
Chairman and CEO of Turner Broadcasting (Gunther, 2002:110).  
 
AOL-Time Warner operates a strategy of multiplexing a number of its broadcast 
network, through the cross-platform distribution of programs such as Charmed and 
The Gilmore Girls on its broadcast network WB and its cable network TNT).  As a 
relatively new network trying to establish itself and its programming, multiplexing 
allows WB to grow its audience, and generate aggregate ratings to compete with the 
established ‘big four’.  While AOL-Time Warner’s broadcast groups earn almost 20% 
of its income, multiplexing is seen by the company as being vital to meeting ever 
increasing production costs, and its ability to sell integrated advertising packages 
across the parent company’s multiple platforms. While major advertisers like 
McDonalds and Coca-Cola have signed up for multi-platform cross-promotions, the 
company is still a long way from establishing the much vaunted synergies its merger 
promised, as discussed below.  
 
Much is made of content that ‘travels’, realising economies of scope on the basis of its  
global reproducibility through a vertically integrated television company like News 
Corp’s Sky Global initiative.  Sports content has been branded in this respect as ‘the 
killer application’, and Rupert Murdoch has described it as his ‘battering ram’ for 
entry into new television markets (Chenoweth, 2001).  However, sport requires 
specific investment in multiple markets and has less ‘networking’ or ‘multiplexing 
opportunities’ than film and general entertainment programming.  Despite its global 
popularity, it remains particularly local or regional in its consumption and therefore 
requires a lot of direct investment in local markets to secure audiences. Business 
analyst Jake Waters has observed that observed that: 
 
At a very high level the competition and emotion invested in sport is something 
that is common around the world, but the individual sports and competitions that 
different countries care about varies tremendously.  As a result, sport is truly 
global, yet the specific sport is intensely local.’ (Waters, 2000:24).  
 
This parochialism means that the networking of sports programming involves 
intensive localising. It also means that the ‘cultural discount’ (Hoskins and Mirus, 
1998) attached to sports programming when distributed outside of the context of its 
local competitions has the potential to be very high indeed. This in turn places a 
premium on access to some of the more ‘globalised’ sports, such as the Olympics and 
Winter Olympics, the football World Cup and Formula One motor racing, yet makes 
it difficult to realise the costs of acquiring rights to many local and national sporting 
competitions from outside of their home markets particularly difficult.  
The case of sports rights has, in recent years, supported the value of combining 
content and platform ownership.  As new pay television services were launched in the 
1990s, the sports rights market exploded as competing services bid up the value of 
sports content.   However, the last three years have seen a contraction in platform 
numbers and a ‘reflux of horizontal integration’ (Pereira, 2003). This has been 
particularly strong in Europe, with AOL/TW and Vivendi Universal recording heavy 
losses and selling off some of their pay television interests.  Attrition has seen the 
closure of ITV Digital in the UK, the merger of Spanish platforms Canal Satellite and 
Via Digital and the union in Italy of platforms Telepiu and Stream.  With a greatly 
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reduced platform base to compete for content, the cost of programming has fallen 
significantly.  
While this devaluation of content has seen News Corporation heavily write-down its 
sports assets, it has also presented the company, as a major platform owner and 
purchaser of sports rights, with a significant medium-term opportunity to reap the 
benefits of this reduction. It has thus far proved to be the media conglomerate most 
likely to turn theory into practice and speculation into profits through the realisation 
of economies of scope through the processes of vertical integration.  The company’s 
investments in international pay television platforms, combined with its readymade 
Hollywood content bases and global sports rights holdings, provide a solid foundation 
for global expansion. The purchase of the US satellite platform DirecTV further 
strengthens the content and production base, by providing News Corporation with its 
long sought-after North American subscription distribution service (Chenoweth, 
2003).   
Spurious Synergies: AOL-Time Warner since 2001 
 
In the post ‘dot.com’ world, AOL-Time Warner has become the world’s largest 
cautionary tale. With its share price in mid-2003 at one-quarter of the level that it was 
when the merger was announced in January 2001, and having posted the largest net 
loss in world corporate history – $US98.7 billion in 2002 – it is not hard to find 
anyone who would reject the claim that the synergies sought in the merger of AOL 
and Time-Warner has failed. Yet at the time of the merger, it was generally expected 
to succeed, and much energy was invested, both by its competitors and public interest 
advocacy groups (e.g. Aufderheide, 2002). What was the ‘it’ that failed in the case of 
the AOL-Time Warner merger? 
 
The general consensus is that the failings of the AOL-Time Warner merger prove the 
limits of synergising content and delivery platforms across traditional broadcast and 
online media. There is certainly much truth in this, particularly as it becomes apparent 
‘content is not king’ (Odlzyko, 2001), at least not in the forms that it is delivered to 
consumers through networked ICTs. But the merger also draws attention to two of the 
problems with problems with vertical integration and conglomeration strategies that 
critics of the ‘bigger equals more powerful’ position in media analysis have been 
pointing to.  
 
One is that much of the so-called vertical integration can be one section of the 
organisation cross-subsidising another. It became apparent, for instance, that of the $5 
billion AOL-Time Warner spent on advertising in 2001, $468 million was ‘spent’ on 
advertising across its own media portfolio (Fine and Elkin, 2002). Intra-corporate 
advertising and cross-promotion is, of course, heralded as one of the benefits of 
conglomeration, but it can create the illusion of advertiser demand for placement 
within content that is, in terms of overall corporate revenues and profitability, 
somewhat illusory.  
 
The second issue raised by expansion through diagonal integration is that of 
incompatibilities between the different organisational elements of the newly-merged 
entity. These have long been rumoured to be a problem within Time-Warner, 
particularly since the 1996 merger with Turner Entertainment with its high-profile 
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CEO Ted Turner, but intensified with the merger, particularly at AOL as the ‘content’ 
strategy moved it from its core business in promoting connectivity. Insofar as benefits 
could be derived from closer links between the two companies, it is arguable that 
licensing arrangements and joint ventures – the network enterprise model – could 
have achieved the benefits of cross-platform synergies without the risks associated 
with conglomeration.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has sought to undertake three activities. First, it has explored the 
institutional tradition and its relevance to undertaking a political economy of media 
and communication. It has drawn out from this literature a critical evaluation of 
organizational strategy and its relevance to expansion in the media sector. Second, it 
has identified different expansion strategies for media corporations, and drawn 
attention to the limits of the ‘bigger is better’ approach to media corporations seeking 
to achieve greater control as institutions over their external environment. In relation to 
the nature of media competition in an age of globalisation, it suggests not the 
disappearance of competition in an age of globalisation, but rather changes in the 
forms and strategies associated with competition. The immanent break-up of Vivendi 
Universal certainly confirms that size in itself is not in and of itself a guarantee of 
success, and the extension of the model of monopoly capitalism from national to 
global markets, as undertaken by critical political economists such as Herman and 
McChesney, may require a greater degree of analytical scrutiny than has often been 
the case. Third, using News Corporation and AOL-Time Warner as case studies, this 
paper has found evidence that supports those who argue that there are limits to 
conglomeration as a synergistic expansion strategy, particularly as media corporations 
become increasingly global in their sphere of operation. Rather, it has found evidence 
to support Castells’ (2001) assertion that the network enterprise model is particularly 
well suited to an understanding of News Corporation’s global expansion, and provides 
insights into the limits of the synergistic expansion model pursued through the merger 
of  AOL and Time Warner in 2001.  
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1
 Tomlinson (1982) has argued that these goals are by no means synonymous, and do not provide a 
predictable guide to corporate behaviour. It is possible, for instance, that losses may be accepted within 
a particular industry sector in order to expand overall market share, which may be at odds with the 
strategy that would maximize the overall corporate profit rate. Also, corporate decision-making may be 
driven by a perceived ‘short-termism’ among financial institutions and capital markets, which priorities 
short-term returns for shareholders over longer-term capital investments. 
2
 This should not, however, be seen as presenting a case for the disappearance of difference between 
the institutional frameworks of national economies. Christopherson (2002) has observed that corporate 
governance regimes significantly influence approaches to time and risk in different national economies. 
She argues that a focus on short-term profitability and an acceptance of investment risk being much 
stronger in the United States than in countries such as Germany and Japan. This has rendered the 
United States more dynamic in the development of innovation-based and intellectual capital-based 
production. As the ‘dot.com’ failures and the bankruptcy of Enron and WorldCom show, however, it 
also generates a system of management rewards where the salaries of Chief Executive Officers and 
other major managers was linked to growth in the share price of the corporation, promoting a culture of 
non-disclosure of adverse information and excessive risk-taking. 
3
 The AOL-Time Warner merger was valued at $350 billion when announced in January 2000, and was 
at $128 billion at the time in which the merger was approved by the US Federal Communications 
Commission. The fall in value reflects the fall in share values for the two companies over the course of 
2000, as the value of Internet and new media stocks fell sharply.  
4
 All figures are taken from the AOL-Time Warner Annual Report 2002 and the News Corporation 
Annual Report 2002.  
5
 By contrast, AOL-Time Warner sold 64 per cent of its stake in China Entertainment Television & 
Broadcast (CETV) to the Hong Kong-based TOM Group in July 2003, only 18 months after 
establishing CETV as one of the first ventures by a Western media organisation into mainland China, 
and after having invested $US60 million in the venture (TV Asia, July 2, 2003).  
